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my question, in this work, will be: how do human beings create such complex phenomena 
as money, government, property, and marriage?
here, i will maintain four theses. first, all of human institutional reality is created in 
its initial form by a certain type of linguistic representation that has the same logical 
structure as declarations and as these create Status functions, i call them Status 
function declarations. Secondly, institutional reality is maintained in its continuing 
existence by Status function declarations. Third, the status functions without exception 
function to create power. So the purpose of institutional facts is to create power relations. 
fourth, the powers in question have a very peculiar status, because they function by 
creating reasons for action that are independent of the desires or inclinations of the 
agents in question. all institutional facts are created by Status function declarations, 
and these Status function declarations create deontic powers, and deontic powers, when 
recognized, give desire independent reasons for action. 
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there is an overriding problem in philosophy. it is the problem of how to 
reconcile what we know about the world from physics, chemistry, and the 
other hard sciences with what we think about ourselves. the hard sciences tell 
us that the world is entirely composed of physical particles in fields of force, 
and thus is composed of mindless, meaningless entities. everything consists 
of “atoms in the void”. yet we think of ourselves as conscious, free, rational, 
linguistic, political, aesthetic, ethical, creative, speech act performing 
animals. our question is, how can we show how our self-conception is not just 
consistent with, but is in in fact a natural consequence of what we know about 
the reality as described by physics and chemistry and other hard sciences? 
how do we get from protons to presidents and from electrons to elections? 
the human reality is based on, and in a sense we need to explain, composed of, 
the basic reality. We need an account that shows how human aspects of reality 
grow naturally out of the brute physical aspects of reality. today i am going to 
talk about one aspect of this larger problem. 
i am going to assume that we have a solution to the traditional “mind-
body problem”, that we have an account of how conscious intentionality 
arises out of neurobiological process just as the neurobiological processes 
themselves arise out of a more fundamental physical process. i am going to 
assume then that we already have a world that contains conscious human 
beings, and our question is: how do such animals create such complex 
phenomena as money, government, property, and marriage? 
Before launching into the problem, i want to say something about my own 
history in investigating these issues. When I first began work in philosophy, 
i worked mostly on the philosophy of language, and i wrote a book on 
speech acts (Searle, 1969). the book was written at a time when Wittgenstein 
was the dominant philosophical influence, and in my own case, I was also 
influenced by my teachers J.L. Austin and P.F. Strawson. The basic idea 
behind the book Speech acts is that we ought to think of language as a form 
of intentional human activity, like playing a game. and just as in playing a 
game, we make certain moves that count as having such and such a status 
in the game, so when we play the game of language, we make such and 
such moves that constitute having such and such a status in the game of 
language. in a game, if i kick a ball in the net, that counts as a goal. if i move 
my knight into a certain position, that counts as putting the opposing king 
in check. Similarly, when i make certain utterances through my mouth, 
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that counts as making a statement or making a promise. i thought the 
basic principle that underlies both games and speech was what i called 
constitutive rules—rules that do not just regulate a pre-existing activity, but 
rather constitute the very activity that they regulate. and it also seemed to 
me that the general form of constitutive rules was “X counts as y in context 
c”. So, for example, such and such a move of the knight counts as a legal 
move, and such and such a legal move counts as putting the opponent in 
check, and such and such a type of check counts as checkmate. Similarly 
with language: such and such occurrences count as making a promise. 
certain other utterances count as making statements or commands. my 
approach was part of the general anti-cartesianism of that philosophical 
era. We were to think of meanings not as sets of introspectable entities, but 
rather knowing the meaning of words and sentences is a matter of having 
certain abilities to engage in speech acts. i think that this approach is 
basically right, but I have had to make certain fundamental modifications in 
it in my overall philosophical approach. 
When I first began work on these issues, I wanted to use the analogy with 
games to explain language, but in fact in turns out that i have to use 
language to explain games. games presuppose language in a way that 
language does not presuppose games. on the account that i am about to 
present you, language is not just one social institution among others, it is 
the fundamental social institution. all of the others depend on language in 
a way that i am going to explain. intuitively, we feel there is something right 
about this approach, because it seems natural to think that a tribe might 
have a language and not have money, private property, and government. 
But it seems impossible that they could have money, private property, and 
government without having a language. 
When I wrote my first book on this topic, The Construction of Social reality 
(Searle, 1995), i thought that institutional reality could be explained with 
a very simple set of four fundamental concepts. These are first the ability 
to cooperate, to have what i call collective intentionality, and second, the 
ability to impose functions on objects where the function is the result of 
the imposition of a certain kind of intentionality on the object. these two 
features—collective intentionality and the imposition of function—are not 
unique to the human species. Beaver dams and birds’ nests are also the 
imposition of functions on objects, and such functions are typically the 
result of collective activities, of collective intentionality. But a remarkable 
thing about human beings, and this is the third of my explanatory concepts 
i need to explain, is that they have a capacity to impose a special kind of 
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function on objects, which i call a “Status Function”. a Status Function 
is a function that can be performed only in virtue of the fact that there 
is a collective acceptance of the object as having a certain type of status, 
and with that status goes a function that can be performed only to the 
extent that the status is collectively accepted. think of the president of 
United States, the twenty euro note in my pocket, or my position as being 
a Professor of Philosophy at the University of california in Berkeley. all 
of these are Status Functions, in that they are not functions that can be 
performed solely in virtue of the physics of the object, but they require a 
certain status and a certain collective acceptance of that status. it seemed 
to me that my earlier discussion of constitutive rules gave us the mechanism 
for understanding these Status Functions. the form of the imposition of the 
Status Function is that a certain entity X, a person or an object, counts as 
having a status y in a context c, and the acceptance of that status y carries 
with it a function F, which can only be performed in virtue of the collective 
acceptance of that function. this was the fourth of my fundamental 
explanatory concepts, the use of constitutive rules to create Status 
Functions. 
the basic idea of a Status Function is so important, and the logical structure 
of its imposition and maintenance is so central to the understanding of 
human civilization that i want to say a little bit more about it. the basic 
idea is this: many functions of objects can be performed solely in virtue of 
physical structure. think of the pocket knife that i have or the fountain 
pen that i have or the shoes that i wear or the car that i drive. all of these 
perform their functions in virtue of their physical structure, but with our 
serpentine human ingenuity, our lives are permeated by objects that do not 
perform their functions solely in virtue of physical structure. think of the 
money in your pocket or the credit cards that you carry or your position 
as a citizen of italy or of the United States. think of Barack obama’s role as 
president or the congress of the United States acting to pass legislation. all 
of these are entities that can perform their function only in virtue of a set 
of attitudes that people have, collective intentionality, but the collective 
intentionality is of a peculiar kind. it is of a kind that enables us to assign a 
status to an object where the object can perform the function only in virtue 
of the collective recognition of the status, and just to have a label, i call 
these Status Functions. 
now these four concepts—collective intentionality, the imposition of 
function, Status Functions, and constitutive rules—gave me a very powerful 
set of concepts for analyzing social and institutional reality. and it seemed 
to me also that i had the general form right, and that the form of the 
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imposition of status functions is always the constitutive rule in the form “X 
counts as y”. this is the general structure that explains money, government, 
property, marriage, universities, cocktail parties, summer vacations, 
lawyers, doctors, and all sorts of other things that we think of as important 
to human civilization. this furthermore is how we differ from other 
animals. there are lots of animals that apparently cooperate with each 
other, and it is interesting how far collective intentionality extends, but 
for our present purposes it does not matter. human beings have collective 
intentionality, and this is a remarkable feature about us. given collective 
intentionality, and given the application of principles of the form “X counts 
as y in c”, we can create and maintain Status Functions.
you might think that if that is your theory of human institutional reality, that 
it is simply a matter of X counts as y in c, then it looks much too feeble. how 
can we explain human civilization just by the repeated application of this not 
very substantive sounding formal principle? it seems too weak to account for 
human civilization. i appreciate the force of this worry, but i want to remark 
that constitutive rules have certain remarkable properties of a purely formal 
kind. Specifically, the application of the rule iterates upward indefinitely, 
and it spreads out laterally indefinitely. I want to illustrate these two formal 
features. as i said earlier, i make certain noises through my mouth, and that 
counts as uttering a sentence of english, but uttering certain sentences of 
english counts as making a promise; and making a certain sort of promise 
counts as undertaking a legal contract; and undertaking a certain sort of legal 
contract counts as getting married. now notice what has happened in the 
preceding sequence. We had X1 counts as y1, but at the next level, y1 becomes 
X2, which counts as y2, and then y2 becomes X3, which counts as y3, and 
so on upward indefinitely. There is no limit, other than human exhaustion 
and inability to understand complexity, to how far upward you can keep 
going with the iteration of the formula “X counts as y in c”. Furthermore, 
the application of the formula spreads laterally. So i do not just have money, 
but i have money in my bank account at the Bank of america on telegraph 
avenue, and it is placed there by my employer, the regents of the University 
of california, and i use it to pay my Federal and State income taxes and all 
sorts of credit card bills and other forms of debt that i undertake. now in 
the sequence of entities that i just mentioned, with a possible exception of 
telegraph avenue, all are Status Functions. the University of california, 
the regents, income tax, credit cards—all of those are Status Functions. So 
the application of the formula iterates not only upward, but it spreads out 
laterally. you never just have an institutional fact on its own, but you have an 
institutional fact in a huge network of other institutional facts.
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i think that the theory i just described is a pretty good theory, and what i 
am going to do is show how, by making certain small adjustments, we can 
increase its power enormously. 
The first thing to notice about the theory as stated is that it allows for 
certain sorts of apparent exceptions. So, for example, we need not have 
an established procedure in order to create a status function. it is true 
that i count as a citizen of the United States or i count as a professor at the 
University of california in Berkeley, because i satisfy certain X conditions, 
which count as constituting these y status functions; but sometimes we can 
just create an institutional fact without any of these, without a constitutive 
rule. you just decide collectively to treat somebody as the boss. you might 
even do it informally. you might say, “Well we cannot really do anything 
until Sally gets here. We better not make any decisions until we consult 
with Sally.” in doing this, we are treating Sally as having a status function, 
without there being any antecedently existing institution. maybe, indeed, 
that is how institutions get started—somebody just decides this is my house, 
that is my property, this is my woman or my man, this person is our boss. So 
we have what we might call ad hoc cases, where there is no constitutive rule, 
but you just create status functions out of the blue. 
another interesting apparent counterexample to the theory as i originally 
stated it is that sometimes you can create a status function without 
imposing a function on a preexisting X term. you just, so to speak, create 
an institutional fact out of the blue. an obvious example is the creation 
of corporations. We do not take some entity, some building or group of 
people, and make it the case that they are now a corporation. rather, we 
just make it the case that an entity that did not previously exist, such and 
such a corporation, now exists. and this enables us to assign further status 
functions to people, such as officers in the corporation or shareholders in 
the corporation, but the corporation itself is not a physical entity on which 
a status function has been imposed. it is created, so to speak, out of nothing. 
another example is money. there is a certain irony when we consider these 
cases, in that my favorite example of an institutional fact was always money, 
where we take pieces of paper or bits of metal and count them as currency 
or coins, but interestingly, most of our money has no physical existence at 
all. if you think that in the bank where you have your bank account there 
must be a drawer with your name on it where they keep your money, you 
have a mistaken conception of how banks work. What actually happens is 
that your money has no physical existence as such, but rather, the bank has 
a representation of your money. it keeps a record, the only physical form of 
which are magnetic traces on computer disks, where they record the amount 
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of money you have in the bank; and then changes in the amount of money you 
have consist entirely in changes in the representation on the computer 
disk. What is happening in these cases? how can there be something as 
powerful as money where there is no physical existence to the entity at all 
but just representations of the existence of the entity? 
one of the marks of the philosopher is the ability to be astounded by 
what any sane person takes for granted. i think most people take money 
and corporations for granted. But if you think about them, they are both 
amazing human creations. if you think for a moment about the limited 
liability corporation, it is a wonderfully ingenious fabrication. a set of 
huge, powerful institutions with no physical reality at all. of course there 
are buildings and people, but they are not constitutive of the corporation. 
the corporation is just an abstract entity. and similarly with money. 
Money starts out as physical objects, but then we find you do not need the 
actual physical objects. all you need are representations of quantities, 
and the ability to change the amounts of the representation by way of 
exchanging one quantity of money for something else or for some other 
quantity of money. these exchanges are called buying and selling.
these two types of cases force an interesting question on us. how can 
we make something the case as represented by being the case, even 
though there is no X term which we represent as acquiring a new factual 
feature? in order to explain how this works, i have to say a little about how 
language works. 
i said in the earlier sections that we are going to explain how to reconcile 
human reality with non-human physical reality. in this investigation, there 
are two principles we have to keep in mind. The first is: we live in one world. 
We must not accept any kind of dualism that says that there are two kinds of 
entities—the mental and the physical—nor, even worse, trialism, the view that 
says there are three kinds of realities—mental, physical, and cultural. there is 
only one reality. We all live in it. We have to explain how it works. the second 
principle that we have to follow in this investigation is that any mechanisms we 
postulate must be simple. humans are not so intelligent as to be able to apply 
very complex mechanisms. rather, there is a simple mechanism that creates 
complex human reality by its repeated application. 
in order to explain how humans create institutional reality, and thereby 
create the distinctive features of human civilization, i have to say a little 
bit about the nature of language. in what follows, i am going to give you a 
five minute summary of some of the central features of the theory of speech 
acts. i apologize for the brevity, but i need some of these results in order to 
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answer the question we are facing.
the basic form of the speech act is F(p), where the “F” marks the type of 
speech act it is, what austin called its illocutionary force, whether it is a 
statement, promise, or command, and the “p” marks the propositional 
content. thus, the statement that you will leave the room and the order 
that you will leave the room have the same propositional content, the same 
“p”, but each has a different “F”, a different illocutionary force, that of a 
statement, and an order respectively. if we ask ourselves how many types of 
such speech acts are there? one basic way of classifying them is by how they 
relate to reality. Some of our utterances are supposed to match how things 
are in the world. the philosophers favorites are statements and assertions. 
thus, philosophers like examples such as “all men are mortal”, “the cat is 
on the mat”, and “Socrates is bald”. all of these are supposed to match an 
independently existing reality, and to the extent that we do, we say that 
they are true or false. i like to think in simple metaphors. think of these 
as matching reality or failing to match. they have what we could call the 
word-to-world direction of fit, and I represent that with a downward arrow 
thus ↓. But not all utterances set out to be true or false, and not all of them 
attempt to describe an independently existing reality. Some are designed 
to get people to change reality, and typical examples of such utterances are 
orders, promises, commands, and requests. Such speech acts have the world-
to-word direction of fit, because the aim of the speech act is not to tell us how 
things are, but to try to get the world to change in the form of the behavior 
of the speaker or hearer so that the world changes to match the content of 
the words. I represent the world-to-word direction of fit with the upward 
arrow thus ↑. I call the first class of speech acts that have the word-to-world 
direction of fit Assertives. The second type of speech acts that have the world-
to-word direction of fit breaks into two kinds: Directives, which includes 
orders, commands, and requests, and commissives, which include promises, 
vows, threats, and pledges. So far, then, we have three classes of speech acts: 
assertives, where the aim is to match an independently existing reality, 
directives, where the aim is to get people’s behavior to change to match the 
content of the speech act, and commissives, where the aim is to commit the 
speaker in varying degrees to changing his behavior to match the content of 
the speech act.
A fourth class are cases where we take the fit for granted and express some 
feeling or attitude about the state of affairs represented. So, if i apologize for 
stepping on your foot, thank you for giving me the money, or congratulate 
you on winning the prize, then in each case i take it for granted that i have 
stepped on your foot, that you have given me the money, that you have 
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won the prize, and the whole point of the speech act is to express some 
psychological state about that. In such cases, I say the fit is presupposed. I 
call these expressives.
The fifth class of cases is the most interesting from the point of view of 
our present investigation, and those are cases where we make something 
the case by representing it as being the case. that is, we make it the case 
that the world matches the propositional content of the speech act, and 
thus we achieve world-to-word direction of fit, but we make it the case by 
representing it as being the case, by representing it with the downward 
or word-to-world direction of fit. I represent these with an arrow that has 
both directions of fit thus . the most famous cases of these are the so 
called “performative” utterances, where we make something the case by 
saying that it is the case. i make a promise by saying “i promise”. i adjourn 
the meeting by saying “the meeting is adjourned”. a government declares 
war by saying “War is declared”. Performative utterances always use a 
performative expression, such as “apologize”, “thank”, and “congratulate”. 
i call this class of speech acts declarations, because they make something 
the case by declaring it to be the case. they are remarkable in the philosophy 
of language, and indeed, as far as i know, only humans have this capacity to 
create a reality by representing that reality as existing. declarations, as i said, 
are often performed by performative verbs, but often we make something 
the case by representing it as being the case without using an explicit 
performative verb. it says on american currency “this note is legal tender 
for all debts public and private”, but when they say that, the officials are 
not reporting a preexisting fact, nor are they ordering a fact into existence, 
they are making something the case by representing it as being the case. 
they are performing a declaration. it is important to emphasize that in the 
Declaration, though the speech act has two directions of fit, it is not the case 
that two speech acts are performed. When i adjourn the meeting by saying 
“the meeting is adjourned”, i make it the case that the meeting is adjourned, 
and thus achieve the upward or world-to-word direction of fit, but I do it in 
the same speech act by representing the meeting as adjourned by means of 
the word-to-world direction of fit. It is not like having two directions of fit 
next door to each other. it is not like an order together with a statement, but 
rather it is a single speech act with both directions of fit at once. 
now, i want to advance a very strong claim, and it is one of the most 
important points in this lecture. all of human institutional reality, and 
indeed all of human Status Functions, and in that sense all of human 
civilization, is created and maintained by repeated applications of the 
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declarational form of the speech act, and this is done for the purpose of 
creating and maintaining Status Functions. For that reason, i call these 
speech acts Status Functions declarations. For example, Barack obama is 
the  president of the United States, i am the owner of certain property in 
Berkeley, and the piece of paper in my wallet is a 20 euro note, and all of 
these facts are created by linguistic representations that have the logical 
form of Status Function declarations. they need not always be explicit, as 
i said earlier, someone might become the boss just by being treated as, or 
regarded as, or in other various ways represented as being the boss, but in 
every case it is a representation that has a double direction of fit. It makes it 
the case that something exists by representing it as being the case. 
it is perhaps important to emphasize that the representations that maintain 
a status function need not take the form of explicit declarations. thus, for 
example, when someone simply introduces Barack obama in front of the 
United States congress as the president of the United States, we are reinforcing 
his position as president, as having the status function of the presidency. the 
important points to make, however, are these two: all of human institutional 
reality—money, property, government, marriage, cocktail parties, stock 
market transactions—are all created in their initial form by representations 
that have the double direction of fit by Status Function Declarations. 
But secondly, they are maintained in their existence by continuous 
representations that have that same double direction of fit. 
one of the ways to observe this last point, that the representations are 
essential for the continued maintenance of the existence of status functions, 
is by observing social change. So, for example, revolutionary movements 
find it necessary to alter the vocabulary. In the Russian Revolution, the 
revolutionaries were anxious that people should stop addressing themselves 
by the old forms of address and that everybody should be addressed as 
“comrade”. this marked a change in status functions. Similarly, though in 
a less extreme form, the feminist movement was anxious to get rid of the 
traditional vocabulary of “ladies and gentlemen”, because these marked 
institutional Status Functions that they wanted to alter. 
now one might wonder why do we bother to do this? Why do we bother 
to create these status functions with this elaborate vocabulary and these 
elaborate procedures and codifications for maintaining the status functions 
in existence? and the answer is that we do not do this, typically, for 
decorative purposes, but we create powers in society by means of creating 
an institutional reality. We create power relations among individuals within 
institutional structures. how exactly does it work? all status functions 
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create a certain type of power that i call a “deontic power”, using the 
greek word for duty. deontic powers include such things as rights, duties, 
obligations, authorizations, authority, permissions, and requirements. 
and how do these work? these have a peculiar feature, which i think may 
also be unique to humans among animal species, and that is that when 
individual human beings recognize deontic powers—they recognize for 
example that they are under an obligation to do something or that other 
people have certain rights regarding them—they are recognizing that they 
have desire independent reasons for action. thus, to take an example close to 
home, if i promise to give a talk today in San raffaele, then when i wake 
up in the morning, i have a reason for giving the talk which is independent 
of my immediate inclinations. if i have an inclination to stay in bed or to 
go to a museum, i have to recognize that i have a prior obligation and that 
my obligation gives me a reason for action which is independent of my 
inclinations and which is an obligation which will override my inclinations.
it is no exaggeration to say that this is the glue that holds human societies 
together. Pre-linguistic animals have all sorts of complex social relations, 
but they do not have systems of rights, duties, and obligations, and that 
is why they are unable to maintain the sort of relationships that humans 
can maintain. there is nothing in the animal world analogous to the 
system whereby i can today create an obligation for doing something a 
year, or indeed, many years hence, and then when the time comes, i have 
a reason for acting, for carrying out the action that constitutes fulfilling 
my obligation, and that reason is independent of my inclinations. the 
reason can be the basis of the desire to do something. i want to do it, 
because i recognize i have an obligation to do it; but in this case, the desire 
is grounded in the obligation and the recognition of the obligation gives 
rise to the desire. When i recognize your rights as a citizen and i recognize 
my obligations as results of undertakings that i have taken, then i have 
recognized that i have reasons for acting which are independent of and go 
beyond my immediate inclinations. 
So far then, to summarize, i have maintained four theses. First, all of 
human institutional reality is created in its initial form by a certain type of 
linguistic representation that has the same logical structure as declarations 
and as these create Status Functions, i call them Status Function 
declarations. 
Secondly, institutional reality is maintained in its continuing existence by 
Status Function declarations.
third, the status functions without exception function to create power. 
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they create positive and negative powers. the president of the United States, 
for example, has the positive power to veto congressional legislation,  he has 
the negative power, obligation, to give a State of the Union message every 
year. So the purpose of institutional facts is to create power relations. 
Fourth, the powers in question have a very peculiar status, because they 
function by creating reasons for action that are independent of the desires 
or inclinations of the agents in question. the powers in question are rights, 
duties, obligations, permissions, authorizations, authorities, requirements, 
etc. all institutional facts are created by Status Function declarations, and 
these Status Function declarations create deontic powers, and deontic 
powers, when recognized, give desire independent reasons for action. 
i believe the account i have given so far, brief and tentative though it is, 
provide the basis for much more extensive investigations into political, 
social, and institutional phenomena generally. i will discuss two further 
topics, a political power and human rights.
intuitively, i think it is obvious that a political system exhibits a different 
kind of power from sheer, brute physical power, though of course, just about 
all known political systems require military and police force to back the 
institutional power. the suggestion i wish to make is that all political power 
is a matter of Status Functions, and this is why, in max Weber’s expression, 
the crucial question for any political system as with institutional reality 
generally, is one of “legitimacy”. Political power differs from police power 
and military power in that it is a system of institutional structures and 
these institutional structures will function insofar as they are accepted 
and the question of stability and permanence is always at issue in any 
totalitarian system. From outside, totalitarian systems look simple, where 
the leader has absolute power and any questioning or challenge to the 
leadership is punishable by death. But from inside, the leaders are invariably 
desperately insecure. think of hitler, Stalin, or mussolini, for example. they 
are constantly struggling against the threat of internal subversion. the 
mark of a healthy political system is that the set of Status Functions, the 
system of deontic powers encoded in rights, duties, obligations, political 
offices, courts, and criminal laws is simply taken for granted. To the extent 
that it is taken for granted, the Status Functions seem almost invisible. they 
just become part of the furniture. So, paradoxically, Status Functions tend 
to work best when people are unaware that they are there at all. 
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human rights are a perpetual source of debate, and i think most of the debate 
is confused, because people fail to recognize that human rights are a species 
of Status Function. the peculiarity of human rights is that, unlike most 
rights, the human right is not derived from some prior institutional structure. 
Property rights, marital rights, and educational rights derive from some 
institutional structure and the situation of people within the structure. the 
ingenuity in the concept of a human right is that just being a human being, by 
itself, is treated as a y term. there is no logical reason why this should not be 
the case, but it is a surprising development, and i think it really only emerged 
in its present form at the time of the european enlightenment. the point is 
that human rights provide a set of Status Functions, a set of deontic powers, 
that accrue to individuals not as owners of property, as husbands and wives, 
or possessors of university degrees, but simply in virtue of human beings. 
can we justify such a conception? i think we can, but to do so is a non-trivial 
matter. There are two requirements necessary for any justification of human 
rights. First, we have to have a theory of human nature. So, for example, to 
justify the right to free speech, i think we have to understand that human 
beings are essentially speech act performing animals. the power of speech 
is not incidental to a full human life but is essential. the second feature in 
addition to a theory of human nature is a set of values, we need an axiology, a 
theory of relative values, because of course there lots of things that are human 
in nature, a tendency to violence perhaps, which do not thereby accrue any 
rights. it is because we think not only that the free exercise of speech is 
natural to human beings, but we think it is valuable, that we can justify the 
universal right to free expression.
i believe that the material presented here, material discussed at much 
more length in other works by me, provides a basis for further useful 
investigations in the human social and institutional reality1. 
1  For further discussion of these issues, see my earlier books: Searle (1995), 
and Searle (2010).
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